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Abstract: In this paper, we review the recent Danish and Spanish economic situation to underline 
the effects of the economic crisis in each country. We then present the different kinds of employment 
policy decentralization pursued by each country, revealing that, in spite of their great differences, they 
are not so far apart in some aspects. Finally, we clarify the main ideas underlying the Danish flexicurity 
model in order to find those elements that may result useful for Spain, taking its special features into ac-
count and showing how some recent changes makes the Danish case less interesting for Spanish necessi-
ties. We stress the possibilities of the local level as a point in common to develop active policies focused 
on enhancing human capital.
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1. Introduction
The current economic crisis has had a strong impact on the principal economies around the world. 
Europe has not been an exception and Europeans are living its effects, especially in employment. Spain 
is one of the countries where this impact has been stronger.
In order to find a solution for its unemployment problems, the Spanish Government is pursuing a 
variety of reforms. One of these is related to the improvement of employment services and active labour 
market policies. After labour market reform and pension reform, the modernization of employment poli-
cies is an essential part of the Spanish plan to manage the post-crisis period.
The Danish flexicurity model has been a point of reference, even before crisis, not only because 
of its influence in EU employment strategies, but because it has some especially interesting features for 
Spain’s situation.
In this paper, we review the recent Danish and Spanish economic situation to underline the ef-
fects of the economic crisis in each country. We then present the different kinds of employment policy 
decentralization pursued by each country, revealing that, in spite of their great differences, they are not 
so far apart in some aspects. Finally, we clarify the main ideas underlying the Danish flexicurity model 
in order to find those elements that may result useful for Spain, taking its special features into account 
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and showing how some recent changes makes the Danish case less interesting for Spanish necessities. 
We stress the possibilities of the local level as a point in common to develop active policies focused on 
enhancing human capital.
2. Some data about Danish and Spanish Economies. Current situation of their Labour Markets
A large number of international researches have focused on the Danish and Spanish economies. 
In the first case, because it is an example of flexicurity model, a hybrid between the liberal and Nordic 
welfare states (Madsen, 2005). The success of its results for employment, but also for other important 
macroeconomic indicators as inflation, GDP growth or the employment rate, has attracted the interest 
of other countries and, specially, the EU, which has seen in the Danish case a model of how to make 
compatible a strong welfare state and international competitiveness.
On the other hand, before the international economic crisis, Spain was also considered to be an 
example of success. Its GDP growth rate was one of the highest in Europe, above 3%, enabling Spain to 
surpass average European GDP for first time in its history. Spain’s GDP per capita was higher than Italy’s 
in 2007. Also, the unemployment rate, traditionally high in this Mediterranean country, fell back to the Eu-
ropean average, around the 8%. All these factors permitted many to to speak about “the Spanish miracle”.
Figure 1 shows the GDP growth rate of our two countries before the crisis. Spain grew more than 
the rest of European countries during the entire period. Denmark also registered good growth rates, es-
pecially from 2003 and increased its GDP more than the European average in 2005 and 2006. The result 
of this growth is shown in Figure 2; as mentioned, Spanish GDP was over the European average and the 
Italian result, and closer to the GDP levels of France and the Euro area before the crisis (2007).
Finally, Table 1 lists some of the most important macroeconomic variables of these two countries 
compared with the European level before the crisis (2006).
Denmark EU 27 Spain
Unemployment 3.9% 8.2% 8.5%
Employment 77.4% 64.5% 64.8%
Inflation 1.9% 2.3% 3.6%
Figure 1. GDP Growth Rate.
Data: Eurostat.
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The economic crisis has put an end to this period of success. Especially dramatic has been the 
increase in the Spanish unemployment rate that passed from 8% to 25%. This is probably the most 
important effect of the current crisis for the Spanish economy. Whereas all countries are suffering the 
economic depression in the employment, in the Spanish case the impact is notably high. 
If these data are disaggregated, we can see that the panorama is particularly difficult for young 
people, who have seen their unemployment rate go up to more than 50%. Moreover, if we follow the 
trend, we can see that from the third trimester of 2008, youth unemployment has increased faster than 
the general rate.
Figure 2. GDP per capita in PPS.
Data: Eurostat.
Figure 3. Unemployment rate.
Data: Eurostat.
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The Spanish Government is trying to respond to this extraordinary situation with two different 
kinds of instruments applied in two different fields. On the one hand, from the economic point of view, 
after a first period in which a countercyclical policy was adopted that saw the deficit increase to 11% 
of GDP, the target today is to reduce this big deficit. In order to achieve this goal, all kinds of taxes, 
especially, an added value tax, have been increased and a painful reduction of government expenditures 
implemented. The Government prevision is that the Spanish deficit will be reduced from 7% to 4.5% in 
2013 and 2.8% in 2014 (The European Stability and Growth Pact establishes a limit of 3% of GDP); in 
contrast, European Commission forecasts reduction to only 6% and 6.4%, respectively. 
However, our attention is focused on labour and social policy. In this area, some measures have 
already been taken, while others are going to be implemented. In the first group, labour reforms must 
be underlined; the second group is formed by pension reform and employment services modernization. 
This strategy, which reflects the Spanish government’s conviction that creating employment re-
quires not only economic measures, but also employment policies as an indispensable complement, has 
apparently been stopped by the new Government, which is more focused on reducing the deficit.
Concerning employment policies, there were until recently some explicit signals of a Spanish 
determination to improve employment services: 
“An appropriate response to new challenges means to be capable of creating new jobs, giving new competences, greater 
adaptation capacity and mobility to our labour force […]. Future entails more flexibility and mobility in professional 
careers. Public Employment Services is going to play an essential role in this new dynamic, in which there will be a 
bigger number of employment transitions thought the professional life. Actually they are the instruments to get easier 
those transitions, through properly measures of prospecting, orientation, activation and traineeship. Therefore, Public 
Employment Services activity is important, both crisis periods and expansion times, to accompany and promote the 
changes related to access and improve of employment and make easier the continuous adaptation of employees to the 
new productive model towards to this new model we want to advance” (Rojo Torrecilla, 2010 –author’s translation–). 
Flexibility, security, transitions, and activation are concepts that will mark the future Spanish 
employment policies. After a first period, in 1980’s and 1990’s, characterized by the necessity of giving 
more flexibility to a highly regulated labour market, today it is necessary to pay attention, not only to 
flexibility in a more competitive international economy, but also to employment policy and, especially, 
to active employment policies and social protection. 
Figure 4. Youth unemployment rate.
Data: Eurostat.
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Spaniards have seen the good and the bad face of a more flexible labour market. On the one hand, 
Spain was capable of creating more than one third of total employment in Europe. On the other hand, in 
the worst period of the financial crisis, it destroyed the same percentage of total employment as the rest of 
the EU. Flexibility is a double-edged weapon if it is not accompanied by other instruments that strengthen 
the security of industrial relations. It is necessary to “combine flexibility and security by establishing insti-
tutionalized ‘bridges’ at critical junctures in individuals working lives” (schmid, g., schömann, k.; 2006).
In this new strategy, employment services will have to play a central role. But what is the current 
situation of Spanish employment services? What can we learn from the Danish experience? Is there any 
point in common?
3. Denmark and Spain: Two different kinds of decentralization
Denmark and Spain both share two levels of decentralization, regional and local. However, Spain 
has more than 46 million inhabitants whereas the Danish population is about 5.5 million, making the 
weight of each administrative level very different. Moreover, the complexity of non-central administra-
tion is higher in Spain.
Denmark, after the 2007 Municipal Reform, is divided in five regions. Their populations vary 
from 1,645,825 inhabitants in the biggest one (Hovedstaden) to 578,839 in the smallest (Nordjylland). 
Spain is formed by seventeen Regions or Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autónomas). The 
most populated is Andalucia with 8,353,843 people, while the least populated is La Rioja, with 321,702. 
Fifteen of the seventeen Spanish Regions have more than one million inhabitants.
The local level in Denmark is formed by 98 municipalities (kommuner). In Spain, however, this 
level is composed by two different entities: Provincial Deputations (Diputaciones provinciales), called 
Cabildos Insulares in the archipelagos, and municipalities (Ayuntamientos). The first two entities are 
coextensive with the province, an intermediate institution between regions and municipalities and are 
used in regions with more than one province as an auxiliary level to coordinate municipalities and help 
them in matters that require a bigger size or cooperation among municipalities. On the other hand, the 
number of Spanish municipalities was 8,116 in 2010.
This great number of municipalities situates Spain as a small size of municipalities-country (me-
dian 1,400), while Denmark’s municipalities are a medium size example (median, 55,000) (mouriTsen, 
2008). However, if we consider that more than 52% of the Spanish population lives in municipalities 
with more than 50,000 inhabitants (40%, if we focus on municipalities with more than 100,000) and the 
demographic size of the Spanish regions (described above), it is possible to say that the Danish regional 
level is closer to the Spanish local than the regional one, at least from a demographic point of view (1). 
Whereas both countries have adopted a decentralization process for their employment policies, 
Denmark’s case is focused at the local level (at least, since 2007), while Spain has preferred that re-
gions manage employment policy. In other words, Denmark is a case of “municipalisation”; Spain, an 
example of “regionalization” (mosley, 2009).
Most active policies were transferred to the Auonomous Communities beginning in 1996 and, 
today all Communities have their own employment services (the last one was the Basque Employment 
Service, created by the Budget Law 2/2009 for the Basque Country). The Public State Employment Ser-
vice (Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal), forming INEM, (Instituto Nacional de Empleo) the National 
Institute of Employment, remains exclusively responsible for the administration of unemployment ben-
efits as a part of the Social Security system.
On the other hand, in the Danish case, it is possible to identify two main moments of decentraliza-
tion: in 1994, the reform focused on the regionalization of active employment policies (madsen, 1996); 
from 2001 and, especially, from 2007, a remarkable process of higher municipalisation of these kinds of 
employment policies has occurred. 
1 However, this is a general description. Some Spanish regions or provinces that have few inhabitants, can be compared to 
Danish regions.
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These differences regarding the management of employment policies and, in general, about the 
weight that the local level has in each country, have financial consequences. According to data offered 
by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP – Federación Española de Muni-
cipios y Provincias), Spain is one of the European countries with the lowest municipal expenditures, 
well below the European average (UE-15-2003).
Moreover, if we look at the income side, it is easy to see that Danish municipalities have greater 
financial autonomy. In Denmark, after the 2007 reform, taxes accounted for 57.3% of total revenues, and 
fees and charges 18.7%, whereas grants from the central government made up only 22.8 % (mouriTsen, 
2008). In the Spanish case, grants are the greater part of revenue, with 34.13% of the total, followed by 
taxes, around 32% of total income, while fees and charges are 9.69%.
These data do not mean that Spain is not a decentralized country, but they do show that this decen-
tralization is much more focused on the regional level and to a much lesser degree on the municipalities. 
This is showed in comparative international research that has tried to explain the degree of decentraliza-
tion among different OECD countries, taking four variables: budget flexibility, programmed flexibility, 
eligibility criteria and performance goals (OECD, 2007) 
Figure 5. Relative weight local public sector (% local expenditure/total expenditure).
Figure 6.
Source: OECD (2007).
Source: FEMP.
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This political and financial structure determines the possibilities for the development of employ-
ment policies by municipalities. In terms of defining policies, there are two possibilities. One approach,is 
a three-side agreement between the State, Regions and municipalities. Another path is the development 
of a pact between an Autonomous Community and municipalities; however, this latter approach depends 
on the Region’s willingness to implement reforms and does not permit the implementation of the same 
policies all over the country at once.
At the same time, levels of financial support from other administrations determine the number of 
activities pursued by local employment services and their quality. Both are frequently conditioned by 
the entity that offers the financing. In other words, as we are going to see, Spanish municipalities do not 
enjoy a great deal of autonomy to arrange their own employment policies; they are determined by the 
State and the Regions through the grants that they provide in order to finance employment policies at 
the municipal level.
Currently, according to the process of decentralization described above, Spanish municipalities 
do not have any competencies regarding active labour employment policies. The overall distribution of 
authority for employment policies in Spain is thus as follows: passive policies belong to the State, active 
policies are in the Regions’ hands, whereas municipalities have only a subsidiary roll since their activity 
depends on the others. 
Both the State and the Autonomous Communities finance active employment policies. Neverthe-
less, there is now a strong trend to transfer some of these resources to other entities and organisms, and 
even to the private sector. Municipalities are also recipients of these transfers, although these programs 
are usually co-financed as a compromise of co-responsibility and in spite of the absence of competences.
As a result, around 25% of total of financial resources destined to active employment policies 
are currently managed by municipalities. This also means that about 7% of total investment in active 
employment policies is supported by local budgets. “Considering that this is a voluntary service and 
that municipal budgets are only 14% of total expenditures of all Public Administrations, this degree of 
financial effort dedicated toward a function assumed without formal competences must be considered 
extraordinary” (femp, 2005, 172 –author’s translation-).
Spanish Municipalities have clearly made themselves an important player in the general trend 
towards an increment of expenditures in active employment policies. From 2002 to 2007, Spain has 
increased ALMP expendistures by more than 11% of GDP. Spain is still far from Denmark, Holland or 
Sweden, but above Germany and Italy and close to France.
Table 2. Government Spending as a Percentage of GDP in 2007.
ALMP
Passive 
Policies Total
Unemployment
RateLearning 
and Training PES Incentives Other Total
Spain 0.15 0.13 0.32 0.2 0.8 1.45 2.25 8.3
Italy 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.46 0.71 1.17 6.1
France 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.3 0.92 1.24 2.16 8.4
Germany 0.28 0.27 0.06 0.16 0.77 1.63 2.4 8.4
Netherlands 0.1 0.41 0 0.58 1.09 1.39 2.48 3.2
Denmark 0.33 0.28 0.13 0.57 1.31 1.5 2.81 3.8
Sweden 0.2 0.21 0.48 0.23 1.12 0.66 1.78 6.1
U.K. 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.16 0.48 5.3
U.S.A. 0.04 0.03 0 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.44 4.6
Source: Pérez del Prado, D. (2010). 
More specifically, we can see that the level of expenditure in passive policies is not low and, 
indeed, it is situated at the highest level, together with Denmark. On the active policy side, it is also pos-
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sible to see that the main item is related to incentives, whereas the lowest one is dedicated to covert Pub-
lic Employment Services expenses. This is another argument in favor of developing this specific area of 
Spanish employment policies, as it is clear that Spain has a high deficit in this area compared with the 
other European countries (except Italy, which has an even lower expenditure). Finally, the percentage 
dedicated to training is also low, what is related to the situation of the employment services, showing 
that this is another area that needs stronger support.
These are precisely the two main areas of expenditures in active employment policies in Denmark 
that are most directly linked to the structure of employment policies in this country.
On the one hand, passive policies, unemployment benefits, are based on a division between those 
unemployed that are members of an unemployment insurance fund and those who are uninsured (mad-
sen, 2009). 
This division is also a characteristic for active policies, as we are going to see below. In the first 
case, the insurance system is based on the so-called Ghent system (clasen & Viebrock, 2008),consist-
ing of 31 insurance funds recognised by the State. The current version of the system dates back to the 
last large reform of the unemployment benefits system in 1970, when the state took over responsibil-
ity for financing the extra costs of unemployment benefits caused by increases in unemployment. The 
members of the unemployment insurance fund are therefore only obliged to pay a fixed membership 
contribution, independent of the actual level of unemployment (2)
The uninsured group is formed by unemployed people who have exhausted their right to unem-
ployment benefits or are not members of any insurance fund because of their own decision or because 
they do not meet the membership conditions. These people must apply for cash benefits administered 
by municipalities. 
On the other hand, this two-tiered system also applies to active labour market policies. Tradition-
ally, when it comes to active programmes, the municipalities handled the group of uninsured unem-
ployed, while the insured unemployed were in the public employment system administered by the cen-
tral government. However, recent changes have transformed this model of administration active labour 
policies, as we are going to see in the following section.
4. The Latest trends in the Danish Model of Flexicurity. What can Spain learn from the Danish 
Experience?
Denmark’s employment policies are a fundamental part of the so-called “model of flexicurity”, “a 
third road between a flexible labour market on the one hand and security and welfare for its citizens on 
the other” (madsen, 2009). Specifically, this model is characterized by a well-functioning relationship 
between unemployment insurance, employment protection and active labour market policies.
One of the most famous descriptions of this model is its representation as a “golden triangle” 
(madsen, 2006):
According to this image, the success of the Danish flexicurity model is based on three main ele-
ments situated in each vertex of the figure. The pillars of this model are thus a flexible labour market, a 
generous welfare scheme and active labour market policies.
The flexibility of the Danish labour market is not new; rather it is a “traditional” characteristic of 
the system that emerged from the so-called “September Compromise” in 1899. This agreement between 
employers and trade unions meant that the former have the right to manage their own affairs, meaning 
the right to hire (and fire) the number of workers that they deemed necessary, while the latter are recog-
nized as the legitimate representatives of workers.
This makes the system more flexible and adaptable to constant changes of international and com-
petitive markets, especially for the small and medium sized enterprises that, as in Spain, are the most 
common type of firms in the Danish businessworld. However, Danish flexicurity has adopted one spe-
2 This contribution varies depending on the insurance fund. For 2010, the lowest is 4,368 DKK, while the highest is situated 
in 5,484 DKK. Weighted Average of contributions (contributions and administrative costs) for the six biggest insurance funds 
in number of members for 2010 is 5,113.30 DKK (around 686 €). Source: Danish Ministry of Employment.
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cific kind of flexibility –external or numerical flexibility–, as indicated by high levels of worker flows in 
and out of employment and unemployment.
From the beginning of democracy in 1978, Spain has also tried to make its labour market more 
flexible. While some of labour reforms have referred to internal flexibility (the 1994 reform and, in part, 
the more recent labour reforms of 2010 and 2012), it is true that external flexibility is more developed. 
The strategy to achieve this purpose was not a general reduction of protection through lower severance 
payments, but rather through the generalisation of fixed-term contracts, especially from 1984. As a re-
sult, Spain continues to have one of the highest rates of temporary employment, close to 30%. 
Returning to the Danish case, the second vertex is related to a generous system of income sup-
port for the unemployed. This is also characteristic of a Nordic welfare state and it becomes Denmark, 
considering the prior feature, in a hybrid between a liberal state and a classic Scandinavian welfare state 
(madsen, 2006). We have already seen this in section II.
Thirdly, it is necessary to mention the importance of active labour market policies that, in present 
form, date from the labour market reform of 1994. As we mention above, they are based on a two-period 
benefit system, with an initial passive and a subsequent activation period. This does not mean that there 
are not active measures in the first period, but rather that they are compulsory in the second. On the 
other hand, it is important to underline that the system places a strong emphasis on “rights and duties”, 
that is, the unemployed have the right to receive an individual “job plan” that details the activities to be 
undertaken to get back into the employment, but also the duty to pursue this plan.
This last element is crucial because it enables us to distinguish the Danish model from other kind 
of “workfare” models. It is obvious that if one of the main elements of this model is the “activation”, 
Danish flexicurity must be considered a workfare system, in the sense that both of them share some 
disciplinary elements that are linked with the obligation of work. However, the great difference in the 
Danish version of workfare is that in Denmark, “the unemployed have rights” (jørgensen, 2002).
Two different strategies can thus be identified to incentive the unemployed to return to the labour 
market. The first is mainly based on disciplinary elements and, because of that, is related to the pure 
form of workfare. The second emphasises education and training as the best tools for helping the unem-
ployed to re-enter in the labour market. This is the path followed by Denmark.
In other words, the original flexicurity system was focused on social integration rather than social 
disciplining (Bredgaard et al. 2003). This latter approach defines the problem of unemployment as an 
economic problem in which some citizens lack incentives to “make work pay” because of the generosity 
of the welfare state. Reintegration into the labour market is ensured by demanding work in return for 
benefits, stressing individual obligations for economic self-sufficiency and applying sanctions in cases 
Figure 7.
Source: Madsen (2006).
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of non-compliance. Social integration, on the other hand, defines the unemployment problem as a result 
of a deficit in qualifications or competencies. In this case, training has a double task: it improves the 
unemployed’s qualifications and matches them with market requirements.
In short, “the labour market policy strongly emphasizes training and education of the employed as well as the unem-
ployed, not only to cover an immediate demand of labour power, but also as a more long-term strategy because the 
general qualifications for the labour force have a dynamic effect on the trade composition, and thus also on flexibility 
and in establishing different types of trades. So: improve skills rather than increase mobility and flexibility. Training 
and education rather than work in return for benefits!” (jørgensen, 2002)
Precisely this feature is the most interesting for Spain given its current circumstances: on the one 
hand, in spite of the fact that Spain’s unemployment benefits are less generous than the Danish, we have 
already seen that the data shows a quite generous system with a strong expenditure in passive policies; 
on the other, one of the main Spanish problems is, precisely, the lack of qualification of certain groups of 
unemployed. According to the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), data 
for the first semester of 2010 show that more than 80% of Spanish unemployed have a level of studies 
below primary studies.
Given these circumstances, it is easy to understand why Spain must be interested in, not only acti-
vation, but also in improving its employment policies in education and training. Moreover, participation 
in vocational training “underpins a flexible labour market by increasing the employability of the labour 
force, i.e. improving their numerical and functional flexibility” (bredgaard, 2010a).
Regarding these issues, itis very common to speak about the “qualification effect” which, together 
with “motivation effect”, is a critical element of the golden triangle. The qualification effect is the nor-
mal product of a model that is strongly committed to qualification. As a result of training received, the 
unemployed improve their possibilities for finding a job. Motivation effect refers to the fact that the 
unemployed look for a job more actively in the period immediately before participating in mandatory 
activation. Some studies not only show a strong motivation effect in active labour market policies, but, 
also, that taking these effect into account facilitates evaluation of the qualification effect (rosholm & 
SVarer, 2008; Geerdsen, p. l. 2006).
In the Danish case, the implementation of the 1994 reform also meant decentralization towards 
the regional level. In this sense, it increased the importance of the so-called regional labour market 
councils, giving the social partners strong influence over the administration of the public employment 
service. That is, prior to 2007, the social partners served not just as advisors but rather had executive 
competencies in labour market policies. This was, therefore, another main characteristic of Danish la-
bour market policies (jørgensen, 2002)
This is another interesting element for a hypothetical reform in Spain. There is no executive role 
for the social partners in the management of employment policies at the regional level, much less at the 
local one. In other words, they do not have any executive competencies nor can they manage any part of 
the budget. Their tasks are frequently advisory, as the law usually provides that they given the right to 
express their opinions in affairs that are related to the labour market or social policy. It is important to be 
clear that this is a consultative role only, as the Government or Administration is not obliged to follow 
trade union or employer suggestions.
Nevertheless, trade unions and municipalities usually have close relationships, which facilitates 
the establishment of different kind of collaborations, frequently connected with the development of 
training courses. There are also some private actors that develop activities related to employment 
and that involve trade unions and employers. This is the case of the labour foundations, formed 
and supported by social partners and that develop different kind of programs, some of which are 
related to employment (Mercader et al., 2010). However, these experiences are not situated within 
the Spanish employment system and do not constitute a stable and regular unit of collaboration with 
the employment services; rather, they are quite autonomous and have other kinds of purposes besides 
employment-related issues.
The special configuration of Danish labour market and employment policies, partly a product of 
their institutional history, makes it impossible to export Denmark’s flexicurity model to other countries 
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directly for at least three different reasons (Bredgaard, 2010a): lack of social dialogue and mutual trust, 
difficulties related to transition towards external flexibility and financial implications.
As we have already seen, social dialogue is one of the most important pillars of the Danish 
flexicurity model. The current configuration of labour market policies, employment policies and benefit 
systems depends on or are related to the social partners. More specifically, the model has one of its bases 
in a corporatist system of collective bargaining that is linked directly to the cooperation and mutual trust 
between the social partners and between the social partners and the Government.
Secondly, the transition from an overly regulated labour market like that in Spain to one charac-
terized by external flexibility presents some difficulties. One of the hardest of these is related to those 
employed (employed workers and trade unions) who strongly resist changes because they would lose 
their privileged status (insiders) with respect to others who are living with job insecurity (outsiders).
Finally, it is obvious that generous unemployment benefits require strong financial resources and 
this means that citizens must be determined to pay a level of taxes that supports the system.
However, for the Spanish case, the impossibility of importing the entire Danish model does not 
mean that, it is impossible to choose some elements that may be adopted. If Spain wants to improve its 
employment services following the OECD’s suggestions regarding decentralization, it could deepen its 
current regional system or even undertake a “second decentralization” to the local level. In this latter 
case, Denmark is without doubt a point of reference, not only because its current situation is focused at 
that level, but because, as we have already explained, Danish demographic circumstances mean that its 
regions are more like larger Spanish municipalities.
The participation of the social partners, with executive competencies, in employment policies is 
another aspect in which Spain may also be interested. The social partners are the actors who know best 
the employment situation in their specific areas of activity and, as a result, their knowledge and experi-
ence may be quite useful in the development of new employment strategies, especially at the local level.
Finally, if Spain wants to advance, not only in terms of flexibility, but also in terms of this security, 
this will require strengthening its benefit system with higher quantities for shorter periods, combining 
unemployment benefits with social assistance and establishing connections between active and passive 
labour market policies. Moreover, better employment services must be accompanied by better programs, 
that is, an active labour market policies scheme focused on education and training, which is one of the 
Spanish biggest deficits.
However, the Danish flexicurity model that we have described to this point is not exactly the 
current model in Denmark. From the late 1990’s some reforms have tried to push the model closer to a 
work-first approach. This means that Danish policymaker have increasingly prioritized the motivation 
effect rather than the qualification effect, implying that employment policies have gradually shifted from 
a model focused on human capital to another based on work-first.
This is evident in legislation; however, it was harder to incorporate those changes into the em-
ployment services’ daily functioning. In 2002, the labour market reform entitled “More people into 
employment” was the first step towards a more profound work first approach. “The new government 
intended to ‘close down the activation industry’(especially the purportedly inefficient municipal activa-
tion projects and expensive education and training schemes). Rather than supposedly ‘long-term, inef-
ficient and expensive’ activation programs the objective was to reintegrate the unemployed as quickly as 
possible in the open labour market” (bredgaard & Larsen, 2009)
These reforms included not only policy changes but also organizational changes. These seem to 
have been decisive for the effective implementation of the reform.
In spite of policy makers’ desires, the first reforms did not achieve their intended effects in the 
employment services. In other words, there was an implementation gap. As some studies showed 
(bredgaard et al. 2003: 4), despite the reforms, municipalities continued to work along the lines of the 
human capital and social integration approach. This result has been explained by two different variables. 
On the one hand, policy indicators showed a preference for programs oriented towards the self-moti-
vation of the unemployed, requalification and specific social attention for target groups. On the other 
hand, organizational indicators showed that municipalities considered activation to be a “pure” public 
service and only 3% of them had used contracting-out; local governments retained high autonomy in the 
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implementation of activation policies, mainly because of the lack of a standardization of these kind of 
policies and the resistance of street level case-workers to breaking down performance measures to the 
individual level. In general, this implementation gap was explained by the high levels of local autonomy 
and different perceptions of the problem on the part of the implementing agents and the government.
In order to get over these difficulties, not substantial, but organizational reform took place. Firstly, 
the Danish Government decided to introduce a local government reform, that meant the abolition of 
counties (regional level), transferring their competencies to the central government, and an increase in 
local government size by reducing the number of municipalities. Then, the Government proposed the 
establishment of job centers in each municipality, whose main task would be the return, as quickly as 
possible, of the unemployed to the labour market. These job centers had to be organized as an indepen-
dent municipal agency responsible for job reintegration; however, responsibility for financing, that is, 
benefit administration, would remain in insurance funds (insured unemployed) and in local government 
(uninsured unemployed) hands. In other words, the project sought a unification of employment systems 
(employment services and social assistance), but not benefit administration or the financing system.
In spite of the fact that the Government achieved an agreement to implement this reform partially 
(the new municipal employment system was only to be tested in 14 pilot centres out of a total of 91), 
with its total rollout pending the results of an evaluation that was going to take place in 2010, it was 
finally decided to municipalize all employment services from the 1st of August 2009, even though the 
evaluation was still ongoing (larsen, 2009). 
There were several other important changes in this reform. First, in spite of the fact that the social 
partners are still represented in the national, regional and local employment councils, they have lost 
their active role in setting employment policies and are now relegated to a supervisory and advisory 
role. Second, the reform has also meant that the public financing of the insurance system is now based 
in municipalities. This funding model gives municipalities an economic incentive to provide activation 
services for people on unemployment insurance but it may also be a guarantee that the municipal cash 
balance will not be drained with rapid fluctuations in unemployment. This change is being evaluated 
over 2012 and 2013 (bredgaard, 2010b).
Some studies have suggested that, there are other goals in the Danish reforms beyond the of-
ficially stated intentions of ensuring equal treatment for the insured and uninsured unemployed and 
improving coordinatation and integration of employment services (larsen, 2009): 
Firstly, one non-explicit intention was to gain strategic control over the municipal implementation 
of employment and social policies and to push implementation towards work-first. In other words, the 
Government wanted to reduce the implementation gaps discussed above. This seems paradoxical, as it 
appears the government sought to decentralize competencies for municipalities while at the same time 
trying to gain control over local governments. The result is a new mode of government in employment 
policy called “centralized decentralization” (Bredgaard & larsen, 2009) that tries to gain strategic 
control over local autonomy and front-line workers while shielding the minister from blame for a notori-
ously unpopular policy area by apparent delegation of responsibility to the local level.
Secondly, and as we have already explained, the role of social partner organizations has been 
reduced significantly. Moreover, changes in the financial structure of assisting insured unemployed may 
also weaken the trade unions if municipalities seek to advance their competencies in the field of insur-
ance funds (larsen, 2009).
As a result of all these organizational changes, an update of a study developed in 2001 shows that 
local employment services are today more inclined to emphasize a work-first approach (Bredgaard & 
larsen, 2008, larsen 2009, Bredgaard, 2010b). In general, all indicators of work-first (demands/sanc-
tions, work-test and compliance with labour market needs) are now considered more important while 
indicators of human capital or social integration (improving skills, training, individual consideration 
and quality of life), are considered less important as compared to 2001. The result is that the majority 
of municipal job centres today prioritize finding clients a job as quickly as possible over improving 
employability in the long run or satisfying individual requirements or needs related to social assistance. 
In short, “the designers of the formal policy reform, therefore, seem to have succeeded. The per-
ceptions and strategies of the municipalities have changed” (larsen, 2009). Some of the factors that 
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explain this new result are the strengthening of supervision, benchmarking and output and outcome 
measurement of implementation by the central government; the establishment of specific and clear goals 
that must be achieved by municipalities and penalties (the possibility of contracting out) if those goals 
are not met; the standardization of procedures that limit the autonomy of local workers (with a growth 
of bureaucratization that means less time for the unemployed) and the strict distinction between the job 
centre, focused on getting people into work, and the benefit and social policy department, in spite of 
complaining from the municipalities.
For Spain, these new trends in the Danish flexicurity model are less attractive than the prior sys-
tem. Special characteristics of the Spanish labour market that we have already explained require a model 
that promotes human capital so, as Denmark moves away from this paradigm, it becomes less interesting 
as a model for elements that may be useful to improve the Spanish employment services. In this sense, 
the Danes’ decision to reduce the number and variety of active labour policies and limit the participation 
of the social partners eliminates an important element of innovation and makes the Danish model less 
interesting as an international point of reference.
However, it is possible to obtain an interesting lesson from this last trend for the Spanish case: 
the importance of the organizational or instrumental scheme to improvements in the implementation of 
employment policies. Spain has a stated goal of improving its employment services. Therefore, in this 
sense, what Spain can learn from the Danish experience is not only lessons about substantive reform, 
but also the organizational structure capable of ensuring the implementation of the principles and goals 
of this new system. If Spain decides to turn its employment services in the direction of more and better 
active polices focused on human capital, policymakers must take into account what is the best structure 
for carrying this out. And, in this respect, as the Danish experience demonstrates, the local level can play 
an essential role.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how the Danish variety of flexicurity, focused on human capital 
and social integration, has the best elements to be adopted for Spanish labour market, especially if their 
development is produced by a decentralization of employment policies to the local level. In spite of the 
fact that it is not possible to import wholesale any national model, we have underlined those elements 
that would be most useful given current Spanish circumstances.
Recent trends in Denmark are moving the country’s flexicurity model away from its classic features 
and bringing it closer to a work-first approach. These new characteristics are less relevant for Spanish 
needs and as Denmark moves away from its longstanding flexicurity paradigm, it becomes less interesting 
as a source of elements that may be useful for improving outcomes in the Spanish employment services.
However, the instruments used to develop the recent Danish reforms demonstrate that a specific 
reform needs, not only substantial policy changes, but also instrumental or organizational modification. 
This must be taken into account by Spain in order to improve its employment services and active labour 
market polices. 
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